

# **The 2008-2013 Economic Crisis in Europe: Extreme Right-Wing and Center Right Party Competition on the Saliency of Immigration**

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## **Abstract**

This paper examines the context of the 2008-2013 economic crisis and the party competition between extreme right-wing and mainstream center right parties in Europe around the immigration issue in national parliamentary elections. This paper tests two rival models in the issue based voting literature that comprise positional (spatial) alongside saliency models and draws on an original aggregate level dataset (2005-2012) in order to examine the electoral success of both party families around the issue of immigration. The paper finds that the saliency of immigration provided an electorally successful party strategy, with mainstream center right parties benefiting significantly from emphasizing the saliency of immigration and increasing their electoral vote share considerably. Surprisingly, the paper finds that whilst extreme right-wing parties did benefit from emphasizing the issue of immigration in the context of the economic crisis, this was weaker than center right parties. General patterns of electoral volatility were also found, with incumbent and center left parties across Europe losing out electorally in the economic crisis. Therefore, this paper shows the resilience of center right parties in having the potential to ‘own’ the issue of immigration during times of economic crisis.

## **INTRODUCTION**

There has been a great deal of scholarly research on the systematic ‘rise’ of extreme right-wing parties in Europe of late (Lubbers et al, 2002; Arzheimer 2009; Goodwin and Ford 2014; Goodwin and Milazzo, 2015). Whilst some scholars have examined the party stances and strategies of mainstream center right parties on extreme right-wing parties in the context of economic crises (Tavits and Letki 2014; Halikiopoulou and Vasilopoulou 2013; Pardos-Prado et al, 2013; 2015) few have considered the effects of these stances and strategies on the electoral fortunes of the extreme right-wing party group. There is a paucity of studies that systematically investigate how extreme right-wing and center right parties compete for similar voters during times of economic crisis, particularly around the immigration issue (see Bale, 2008; Bale, Hough, and van Kessel, 2013; Mudde, 2014). More generally, party competition between both party families has been under researched in the contemporary literature (Pardos-Prado, 2015). The central research question of this paper therefore is to examine how extreme right-wing and mainstream center right parties have responded to the 2008-2013 economic crisis and the strategies they have adopted, in particular the degree to which they compete on socio-cultural issues, notably immigration.

### **5.2 THEORY: ‘STRATEGIC EMPHASIS’**

This paper argues that the reason that extreme right-wing parties can gain votes or not depends on how far they emphasize and own arguments over immigration and nationalism, and how far they succeed in doing this is largely a factor of how well competing mainstream center right parties allow them to do this during times of economic crisis. Mainstream center right parties that emphasize and make the immigration issue central to their party ideology are likely to resonate with public opinion on immigration. Some extreme right-wing parties that emphasize the immigration issue will achieve high levels of electoral success during periods of economic crisis (Mudde, 2016; 2014; Arzheimer, 2009). However, the majority of

mainstream center right parties are likely to recognize the electoral threat that the extreme right poses in the economic crisis period, particularly around the issue of immigration that these parties often claim issue ownership over (Bale, 2008; Meguid, 2005). In line with their ideological pragmatism and ability to adapt to political situations, mainstream center right parties will seek to place strategic emphasis on and ‘alter’ the salience of key issues such as immigration that underline party competition in Europe, thereby seeking to ameliorate the electoral threat of the extreme right around the issue of immigration during the crisis period (see Meguid, 2005).

Despite it being a crisis of capitalism, the central argument of this paper is that mainstream center right parties are electorally resilient and will perform electorally better than the extreme right in emphasizing the issue of immigration. The center right will win in the 2008-2013 economic crisis, not because of their economic competence, but simply because they can emphasize the right issue (immigration) strategically. Furthermore, at the same time, my theory argues that mainstream center left parties in Europe are tainted by their association with the issue of immigration and the freedom of movement, thereby performing electorally worse and this is likely to further bolster the electoral success of center right parties at the same time.

### **5.3 HYPOTHESES**

To recapitulate on the central arguments outlined in the theory section, we test following hypotheses:

**H1:** Left-wing and incumbent parties are likely to be punished electorally due to being in office during the 2008-2013 economic crisis and are likely receive a lower vote share in national parliamentary elections (see Lewis-Beck, 1986; Alvarez et al, 2000; Duch, 2008; Hobolt et al, 2012).

**H2:** In line with the theory of ethnic competition, extreme right-wing parties are likely to perform considerably better electorally in times of economic crisis, when they can stereotype out-groups such as immigrants and emphasize the immigration issue to voters (Mudde, 2007; Arzheimer, 2009). However, how far extreme right-wing parties can succeed in emphasizing and ‘owning’ arguments over immigration is a factor of how well competing mainstream center right parties allow them to do this.

**H3:** Mainstream Center Right parties are often not known for their issue emphasis on the immigration issue. However, we argue that the 2008-2013 economic crisis has provided electoral opportunities for this party family to emphasize and ‘own’ arguments over immigration. Based on a theory of ‘strategic emphasis’, center right parties are best positioned to benefit from emphasizing the immigration issue in the economic crisis as they can emphasize immigration strategically, potentially in a more ideologically palatable manner than extreme right-wing parties can. In line with valence models, center right parties may also be viewed by voters as being the best party that can deliver on the immigration issue (Iversflaten, 2005; Bale, 2008; Bale, Hough, and van Kessel, 2013).

## **5.4 RESEARCH DESIGN**

### **Data**

This paper makes use of the Whitefield-Rohrschneider expert survey conducted in 2007-2008 across Western and Central-Eastern Europe that allows the paper to further investigate the emphasis that extreme right-wing and mainstream center right parties place on immigration during the 2008-2013 economic crisis. The Whitefield-Rohrschneider expert survey features the issue salience and issue positions of 190 parties in Europe across 27 European countries, in Western and Central-Eastern Europe (including Moldova and Ukraine)

that have been merged with an original multilevel dataset on country conditions.<sup>1</sup> Aggregate voting data on parties' electoral performances in national parliamentary elections across Europe were also collected from 2005-2012 and are merged into the final dataset. Whilst election timelines differ considerably in national parliaments across Europe, this paper examines the context of the 2008-2013 economic crisis.<sup>2</sup>

In the Whitefield-Rohrschneider expert survey, country experts position political parties along the left-right ideological dimension. Political parties were then distinguished between a 'center' and an 'extreme' category. This produced four categories of parties that form the empirical analysis of this paper, corresponding to: extreme left, center left, center right, and extreme right-wing parties. The dimension of the left-right ideological position of each political party enables a mean to be produced for each country. A standardization process then took place for each country's set of political parties, whereby the mean is set to zero and the standard deviation to 1. For each country, 'left' is defined as including a party with a score of less than zero (to the 'left' of the mean) and 'right' as including any party with a score of more than zero (to the 'right' of the mean). The standardization process resulted in the creation of a cross-nationally specific score that defines 'extreme'. Therefore, any political party with a score higher/lower than 1 standard deviation (1 z-score) above or below the mean is defined as 'extreme' right/left. Two core criteria were used by Whitefield and Rohrschneider to justify parties and their inclusion. Firstly, parties had to have achieved representation in the national parliament and secondly had to have received at least 2% of the national vote in the last parliamentary election (see Whitefield and Rohrschneider, 2015).<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> The countries include Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, the Netherlands, United Kingdom. These data are available from the author.

<sup>2</sup> A more comprehensive overview of political parties and the election years under investigation can be found in Appendix B and C of this chapter.

<sup>3</sup> The study is unable to include the United Kingdom Independence Party in the UK as the party did not achieve representation (seats) in the national parliament in 2005 or in 2010. Secondly, the extreme right-wing party Jobbik in Hungary is not included in this study as there was only one completed election cycle for this party in the 2010 National Parliamentary election.

Validation analysis conducted by both researchers has shown that “there is a high correlation between the ideological placement of parties in expert surveys and the programmatic perceptions of parties by voters” (Whitefield and Rohrschneider, 2015, P.28). Further validation analysis has also shown that the expert survey produced empirical patterns that matched other data sources (see Dalton et al, 2011) such as the Comparative Manifesto Research Project and the Chapel Hill Expert survey.

## **Variables**

To measure party performance in the context of the 2008-2013 economic crisis, our dependent variable is continuous and comprises the % change in vote share (i.e. the change in party performance) from the national parliamentary election before the 2008 crisis to the first election after the 2008 economic crisis hit. A positive or higher score on this variable means that a political party performed better electorally in the 2008-2013 crisis period. A negative or lower score on this variable means that a political party performed electorally worse in this electoral period. A limitation of this operationalization is that it does not contend with parties that changed coalition, alongside the rise and fall of different political parties, and the differing electoral timelines of national parliamentary elections. The final sample size comprises 190 political parties across 27 countries in Western and Central-Eastern Europe. In order to examine electoral support for extreme right-wing and mainstream center right parties in the context of the 2008-2013 economic crisis and provide a more fine-grained approach, a dependent variable is constructed for both party families. This is a similar methodological approach that has been used recently by Pardos-Prado (2015) in examining aggregate level support for extreme right-wing and mainstream center right parties and this paper adopts this same procedure. The change in % vote share for extreme right-wing parties (2005-2012) is constructed alongside the change in % vote share for center right parties (2005-2012). A positive or higher score on this variable means that extreme right-wing and center right

parties performed better electorally in the 2008-2013 crisis period. A negative or lower score on this variable means that extreme right-wing and center right parties performed electorally worse in this electoral period.

The main independent variables include party-level and country-level variables. In order to test the role played by spatial/proximity factors, a variety of issue positions are examined. These issue positions can be grouped into socio-economic and socio-cultural issues. Socio-economic issue positions include parties' stances towards a pro-market economy, pro-welfare (state intervention) alongside support for distribution and inequality. The variables have been recoded in order that higher values on these variables correspond to a % increase in vote share. By including socio-economic positions, this enables the paper to examine the extent to which support for these different issues drives support for extreme right-wing and mainstream center right parties in Europe. Socio-cultural issue positions are then included as independent variables and comprise opposition towards immigration (anti-immigrant sentiment) and support for nationalism. The immigration position variable has been reverse coded in order to make the measure more intuitive and measure opposition towards immigration amongst center right and extreme right-wing parties. In line with the party competition literature, this enables us to ascertain how important stances on key socio-cultural issues such as immigration and nationalism are in explaining electoral support for extreme right-wing and mainstream center right parties in the context of the 2008-2013 economic crisis (Mudde, 2007; Pardos-Prado, 2015).

In order to test the effect of issue salience factors and the emphasis that extreme right-wing and center right parties place on specific issues, a number of issue salience variables are examined. Once more, just as with the issue position variables, the issues that parties emphasize are grouped into socio-economic and socio-cultural issues. Issue salience on socio-economic issues includes pro-market economy, pro-welfare (state intervention)

alongside support for distribution and inequality. This allows us to assess how important placing emphasis on socio-economic issues was in determining the electoral success for extreme right-wing and mainstream center right parties in the economic crisis period. In order to examine (H2 and H3) the emphasis that extreme right-wing and center right parties place on socio-cultural issues, the study includes the issue salience of immigration and nationalism. The central independent variable in this model is issue salience around immigration. A lower or negative score means that a party placed no salience or little importance on the immigration issue, whilst a higher or positive score means that a party placed high salience on the immigration issue and that this issue was central to the party's electoral programme. In measuring the severity of the 2008-2013 economic crisis, two key macroeconomic variables are included and were merged into the final dataset.<sup>4</sup> These variables comprise the change in Gross Domestic Product Growth (GDP) (2008-2012) and the Change in Unemployment (2008-2012). Higher values on the GDP variable correspond to an increase in economic growth, whilst higher values on the Unemployment variable correspond to an increase in unemployment across Western and Central-Eastern European countries. Previous literature has also shown the importance of macro-political factors such as migration levels in explaining the electoral success of extreme right-wing parties at the aggregate level (see Mudde, 2007; Arzheimer, 2009; Pardos-Prado, 2015). This paper examines the change in Migration levels (2008-2012) that has been computed for the 27 countries in the dataset in order to examine the importance of objective levels of migration in determining the electoral success for extreme right-wing and center right parties.<sup>5</sup> The only data that this study could find that had a majority of these countries under investigation was from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). While this was the largest and most comprehensive dataset, it was far from complete and there are a number of countries where

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<sup>4</sup> The data on these variables were extracted from the World Bank and merged into the final dataset.

<sup>5</sup> This data was taken from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and was merged into the final dataset.



official migration numbers could not be included and this reduced the overall sample size considerably.<sup>6</sup>

A number of party-level control variables are included that allows this empirical paper to fully investigate party competition around the immigration issue during the context of the 2008-2013 economic crisis. Previous party competition literature has shown the impact of party-level variables that can increase or reduce a party's electoral performance, particularly in how plurality systems tend to depress support for the extreme right, whereas proportional representation based electoral systems tend to increase support for extreme right-wing parties (see Norris, 2004; Carter, 2005; Arzheimer and Carter, 2006). In order to avoid the problem of omitted variable bias, a number of party-level variables are theoretically included, in line with the existing literature. Dummy variables are also included that capture both proportional and plurality electoral systems. This allows us to establish how both electoral systems impact on extreme right-wing and center right vote share across Europe in the context of the economic crisis. In line with the literature (see Hobolt et al, 2012) dummy variables are also included that allow us to examine how incumbent parties performed electorally in the economic crisis period, alongside the effect of bicameralism (bicameral parliament/a legislature that consists of having two legislative or parliamentary chambers). Party competence is also factored into the models and measures citizens' aggregate levels of confidence by party. This enables the study to examine how far party competence is important in determining the electoral performance of extreme right-wing and center right parties. Higher or positive values on this variable correspond to an increase in % vote share. The final party-level variable includes the dummy variable Western Europe and allows us to examine whether electoral performance for extreme right-wing and center right parties was higher in Western or Central-Eastern Europe.

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<sup>6</sup> The final sample size and information for this variable can be found in Appendix C.

## **Modeling Approach**

In order to fully investigate the central hypotheses (H1-H3) in further detail, advanced statistical models are produced that enable us to investigate whether extreme right-wing parties performed better or not at the start of the 2008 crisis period. Hierarchical linear regression models with random effects are produced to H1-H3 as the dataset is structured at two levels, with parties nested in countries. Level 1 units comprise party-level variables and level 2 units comprise country-level variables. Multilevel models are seen as mathematically robust, providing reliable estimates, with OLS regression models tending to produce unreliable standard errors alongside significance levels when factoring in country-level variables such as the change in GDP levels and Unemployment rates. Multilevel modeling is able to account for these problems (see Steenbergen, 2012; Hox, 2002) and in recent years has become more widely used in comparative research. Four main statistical models are produced that enable us to examine the importance of the immigration issue on the electoral success of extreme right-wing and mainstream center right parties. Model 1 enables the paper to test an aggregate level party model (% change in vote share: 2005-2012) that allows us to investigate the combined effect of party and country-level variables in the context of the economic crisis. Models 2 and 3 also enable us to examine extreme right-wing party support in the context of the economic crisis, particularly around the emphasis on immigration that this party family places. Additional issue positions, issue salience, party-level controls and country-level variables enables this paper to assess the extent to which the extreme right-wing party family can prosper electorally from the recent economic crisis. Model 4 then allows us to examine mainstream center right parties and the extent to which they make use of emphasizing the immigration issue, alongside a variety of issue positions, issue salience, party-level controls and country-level variables that are likely to influence their electoral

performance in the context of the economic crisis. Two additional models are also produced which allow us to compare the strength of the immigration issue on the electoral performance for both center left and extreme left-wing parties during the crisis period. This also enables us to compare the electoral performance on the immigration issue to both extreme right-wing and center right parties.

## **ANALYSIS**

A hierarchical linear regression model is produced in Table 1 and allows us to test an aggregate level party model (% change in vote share: 2005-2012) in the context of the economic crisis. This also allows the paper to investigate the electoral performance of different party families, the impact of different issue positions, issue salience, party-level and country-level factors in determining their electoral performance during the crisis period. Model 1 shows that center left parties saw their vote share decrease substantially across Europe. Incumbent parties also saw a substantial decrease in their overall vote share and this result was statistically significant at the  $p < 0.001$  level, thereby providing evidence for H1. This is likely however to be a general incumbency effect and provides preliminary evidence of an electoral decline for mainstream left-wing parties across Europe during this electoral period with general patterns of electoral volatility found. Table 1 also shows that controlling for additional independent variables, the vote share for extreme right-wing parties decreased in the crisis period and shows that extreme right-wing parties did not benefit electorally from the economic crisis period. The statistical model also shows that extreme left-wing parties lost out considerably, with center right parties also experiencing a decline in their vote share but performing marginally better than the other party families in comparison. When factoring in issue positions, Table 1 suggests that parties' stances on socio-economic and socio-cultural issues did not play an important role in determining their electoral success, with these variables statistically insignificant. A similar picture is found for the socio-economic and

socio-cultural issues that parties made salient, with nationalism having no effect on overall increases in vote share. Most substantively, the empirical results in Table 1 suggest that emphasizing immigration had a positive and statistically significant effect in increasing a party's overall vote share in the crisis period. Party-level controls and country-level variables also show widespread variations, yet are statistically insignificant. Thus far, we have seen a general pattern of electoral volatility in the context of the economic crisis; with incumbents and center left parties losing out considerably alongside the importance of immigration emphasis in explaining increases in vote share (see Kriesi and Pappas, 2015). The next section of the paper explores H2 and H3 in further detail, in seeking to examine whether extreme right-wing and center right parties exploited the economic crisis through emphasizing the immigration issue that provided electoral gains for both party families.

**Table 1: Overall Party Model- % Change in Vote Share: 2005-2012**

	(M1) Aggregate Level Party Model (% Change in Vote Share: 2005-2012)
<b>Party Families</b>	
Extreme Left Party	-2.33 (-1.36)
Center Left Party	<b>-3.36*</b> <b>(-2.14)</b>
Center Right Party	-0.96 (-0.61)
Extreme Right Party	-1.00 (-0.46)
Incumbent	<b>-4.86***</b> <b>(-4.18)</b>
<b>Issue Positions</b>	
Position: Pro-Market Economy	-0.074 (-0.10)
Position: Pro-Welfare	0.36 (0.48)
Position: Pro-Distribution	1.23 (1.15)
Position: Support Inequality	-1.77 (-1.82)
Position: Support Nationalism	-0.03 (-0.05)
Position: Anti- Immigration	0.18 (0.29)
<b>Issue Salience</b>	
Salience: Market	0.91 (1.24)
Salience: Welfare	-2.01 (-1.82)
Salience: Distribution	0.04 (0.04)
Salience: Inequality	0.92 (0.82)
Salience: Nationalism	0.02

	(0.04)
Saliency: Immigration	<b>1.41*</b> <b>(2.17)</b>
<b>Party- Level</b>	
Western Europe	-0.91 (-0.61)
Plurality Electoral System	0.29 (0.26)
PR Electoral System	0.17 (0.08)
Bicameral Parliament	-0.38 (-0.30)
Party Competence	-2.14 (-0.85)
<b>Country-Level</b>	
Change in GDP (2008-2012)	0.27 (0.26)
Change in Unemployment (2008-2012)	0.06 (0.41)
Level 1 Constant (Party-Level)	40.02
Level 2 Constant (Country-Level)	2.91
Level 1 N (Party-Level)	176
Level 2 N (Country-Level)	25

Notes: t statistics in parentheses; statistical significance \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ .

Dependent Variable: (% Change in Vote Share, 2005-2012, National Parliamentary Elections)

In order to graphically explore H2 and H3 further, two scatterplots are produced to identify which extreme right-wing and center right parties were most able to exploit the economic crisis through emphasizing immigration. These scatterplots are outlined in Figures 1.1 and 1.2 below. The scatterplot in Figure 1.1 depicts the emphasis placed on immigration by center right parties and their respective electoral performance. The Finnish Party PS performs considerably better when emphasizing immigration, alongside the UK Conservative Party, the Alliance for the Future of Austria (BZÖ) party and the New Flemish Alliance (N-VA) Party. Turning to the corresponding scatterplot for the extreme right in Figure 1.2, the Hungarian Justice and Life Party (MIEP) party alongside Geert Wilders' Party for Freedom



**Source:** Authors' own figures

Model 2 in Table 2 deploys a hierarchical linear regression model that examines how extreme right-wing parties performed on a number of issue positions and issue salience, alongside party-level controls and country level variables in the economic crisis period. Previous party competition literature has shown that extreme right-wing parties have tended to perform electorally better when holding neo-liberal economic policies (see Kitschelt, 1995). However, recent research (see de Lange, 2007; Carter, 2005) has argued against this claim, providing empirical evidence in showing that extreme right-wing parties tend to perform better electorally when they present a more centrist economic position (i.e. state and government intervention in the economy). Model 2 includes a variable that taps the extent to which extreme right-wing parties adopt pro-welfare/state interventionist policies on the economy and this enables us to determine the electoral success of such a party strategy. The dataset also contains additional socio-economic variables such as support for distribution, however due to multicollinearity issues, this variable was removed from the final model.<sup>7</sup> The full extreme right-wing aggregate level model with party-level and country level variables is summarized below:

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<sup>7</sup> Support for the market economy and the salience of this issue was run for extreme right-wing parties in model 2. However, the variable had little substantive effect and the variable was dropped from the final model due to multicollinearity.



### **Extreme Right-Wing Vote Share Aggregate Model: (Model 2)**

$\% \text{ CHANGE IN ERW VOTE SHARE (2005-2012)} = a + b_{1x1} (\text{PRO-WELFARE}) (\text{State Intervention}) + b_{2x2} (\text{PRO-NATIONALISM}) + b_{3x3} (\text{ANTI-IMMIGRATION}) + b_{4x4} (\text{SALIENCE: WELFARE}) + b_{5x5} (\text{SALIENCE: IMMIGRATION}) + b_{6x6} (\text{SALIENCE: NATIONALISM}) + b_{7x7} (\text{WESTERN EUROPE}) + b_{8x8} (\text{PARTY COMPETENCE}) + b_{9x9} (\text{PLURALITY ELECTORAL SYSTEM}) + b_{10x10} (\text{PR ELECTORAL SYSTEM}) + b_{11x11} (\text{CHANGE IN GDP 2008-2012}) + b_{12x12} (\text{CHANGE IN UNEMPLOYMENT 2008-2012}) + u_{ij} (\text{PARTY-LEVEL}) + e_{ij} (\text{COUNTRY-LEVEL})$

Model 2 in Table 2 suggests that extreme right-wing support in the context of the 2008-2013 economic crisis is not particularly strong, as was shown in paper 1 of the dissertation (see Goodwin, 2014; Mudde, 2016). In line with recent literature (de Lange, 2007) extreme right-wing parties that held more centrist economic positions (pro-welfare) tended to perform better electorally, but this finding was not significant. Model 2 provides two surprising findings, firstly in showing that support of nationalism and opposition to immigration actually decreased the overall vote share for extreme right-wing parties in the context of the economic crisis. Secondly, the negative finding for anti-immigration is particularly noteworthy as it suggests that hardline stances towards immigration not only decreased the aggregate level vote share for extreme right-wing parties, but suggests that their position on this issue may be too hostile and unpalatable for voters in the economic crisis period (see Carter, 2005). Turning to issue salience, variations are found for the electoral performance of extreme right-wing parties. Model 2 suggests that emphasizing centrist economic positions depresses the % vote share for extreme right-wing parties and this finding is in line with recent research (see Rovny, 2013). The statistical model also suggests that emphasizing nationalist appeals decreases the vote share for extreme right-wing parties and this finding is non-significant. Most substantively, model 2 shows that extreme right-wing

parties that emphasized the immigration issue performed better electorally and enabled the party to increase their vote share by 2.86% points. However, whilst the effect is strong, this variable is not significant and calls into question whether the extreme right-wing party can lay claim to ‘owning’ the immigration issue. Party-level controls also provide a compelling picture, in suggesting that the extreme right-wing vote share is reduced in countries which have plurality and PR based electoral systems. Party competence also has a negative effect and support for the extreme right is found to be greater in Western Europe.<sup>8</sup> Turning to macroeconomic conditions at the country-level, inconsistent patterns are found. The change in GDP (2008-2012) is positive and suggests that there is an increase in the extreme right-wing vote share when there is economic growth. Whilst this finding is counter-intuitive, it is weak nonetheless. The change in Unemployment (2008-2012) also yields an interesting finding, with higher levels of unemployment in the context of the economic crisis period actually decreasing the aggregate level % vote share for extreme right-wing parties. A recent empirical study by Goodwin (2014) has shown the inconsistent pattern between macroeconomic conditions and electoral increases in extreme right-wing support, particularly in times of economic crisis. Building on the empirical evidence presented in paper 1, this paper further shows this inconsistent empirical pattern between the 2008-2013 economic crisis and electoral support for the extreme right.

In order to further examine the electoral performance of the extreme right in the context of the economic crisis, an additional model is produced that factors in objective levels of the change in Migration (2008-2012). Due to multicollinearity problems, support for nationalism and anti-immigration had to be dropped from model 3 so that the change in Migration variable could be incorporated into the statistical model. Furthermore, due to missing data on the change in Migration variable at the country-level and the loss in degrees of freedom, the

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<sup>8</sup> The Western European dummy is likely to be the result of selection bias, with more Western European countries in the sample than Central-Eastern European countries.

study as unable to run a multilevel model for model 3.<sup>9</sup> Instead, an OLS regression model with robust standard errors was constructed. Model 3 is summarized below:

**Extreme Right-Wing Vote Share Aggregate Model: (Model 3)**

$$\% \text{ CHANGE IN ERW VOTE SHARE (2005-2012)} = a + b1x1 \text{ (PRO-WELFARE) (State Intervention)} + b2x2 \text{ (SALIENCE: WELFARE)} + b3x3 \text{ (SALIENCE: IMMIGRATION)} + b4x4 \text{ (SALIENCE: NATIONALISM)} + b5x5 \text{ (WESTERN EUROPE)} + b6x6 \text{ (PARTY COMPETENCE)} + b7x7 \text{ (PLURALITY ELECTORAL SYSTEM)} + b8x8 \text{ (PR ELECTORAL SYSTEM)} + b9x9 \text{ (CHANGE IN GDP 2008-2012)} + b10x10 \text{ (CHANGE IN UNEMPLOYMENT 2008-2012)} + b11x11 \text{ (CHANGE IN MIGRATION 2008-2012)} + e$$

A similar pattern is found in model 3 for the effect of socio-economic positions on welfare and the emphasis that extreme right-wing parties placed on the issue. Model 3 suggests that when including the objective levels of migration, the emphasis that extreme right-wing parties place on the immigration issue increases and is statistically significant at the  $p < 0.05$  level. Model 2 is also fairly strong with an Adjusted R<sup>2</sup> of 50%, with much of this variation being driven by the salience of immigration variable. Thus, model 3 provides empirical evidence in suggesting that extreme right-wing parties benefited considerably from emphasizing the immigration issue in the 2008-2013 economic crisis period. However, the overall effect of migration levels on the extreme right-wing vote share is weak and an explanation for this finding may be due to the low sample size and low levels of migration across Europe from 2008-2012. Evidently, model 3 shows that the emphasis placed on immigration is an electorally successful party strategy for extreme right-wing parties and provides evidence for H2.

Whilst models 2 and 3 in Table 2 have provided evidence in suggesting that emphasizing immigration in the crisis period provides electoral pay-offs for extreme

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<sup>9</sup> This model is further limited by the reduction in the number of extreme right-wing parties, from 27 in Model 2 to 19 in Model 2.

right-wing parties, how do mainstream center right parties perform electorally when emphasizing the immigration issue? Model 4 in Table 2 enables us to answer H3 and understand whether this provides an electorally successful party strategy for center right parties in the context of the economic crisis, whilst at the same time comparing these empirical findings with the extreme right. In a similar manner to the extreme right-wing party models in Table 2, a number of party-level controls and country level variables are factored into the model. Historically, in terms of socio-economic policy, center right and parties across Europe are generally considered to be in favour of keeping taxes low and to not interfere with market forces, largely holding neo-liberal economic policies. At the same time, it is theoretically known that center right parties also tend to emphasize the importance of neo-liberal economics (Bale, 2008). In order to capture this neo-liberal economic position and emphasis, a variable that captures support for market economics is deployed in model 4 and is the only major change from the extreme right-wing party models that were produced in models 2 and 3. The center right party model is summarized in model 4 below:

**Mainstream Center Right Aggregate Model: (M4)**

$$\begin{aligned} \% \text{ CHANGE IN CENTER-RIGHT VOTE SHARE (2005-2012)} = & a + b1x1 \text{ (PRO-MARKET ECONOMY)} \\ & (State \text{ Intervention}) + b2x2 \text{ (PRO-NATIONALISM)} + b3x3 \\ & \text{(ANTI-IMMIGRATION)} + b4x4 \text{ (SALIENCE: MARKET ECONOMY)} + b5x5 \text{ (SALIENCE:} \\ & \text{IMMIGRATION)} + b6x6 \text{ (SALIENCE: NATIONALISM)} + b7x7 \text{ (WESTERN EUROPE)} + \\ & b8x8 \text{ (PARTY COMPETENCE)} + b9x9 + \text{(PLURALITY ELECTORAL SYSTEM)} + b10x10 \\ & \text{(PR ELECTORAL SYSTEM)} + b11x11 \text{ (CHANGE IN GDP 2008-2012)} + b12x12 \text{ (CHANGE} \\ & \text{IN UNEMPLOYMENT 2008-2012)} + u_{ij} \text{ (PARTY-LEVEL)} + e_{ij} \text{ (COUNTRY-LEVEL)} \end{aligned}$$

Model 4 shows that adopting pro-market economic positions actually decreases the % aggregate level vote share for center right parties. One explanation for this may be the context of austerity and how this economic strategy did not resonate well with voters during the

context of the 2008-2013 economic crisis. Similarly to the extreme right-wing party model in model 2, center right parties performed electorally worse when supporting nationalism and holding more anti-immigrant positions. However, emphasizing the market economy did increase the vote share for center right parties and this finding was non-significant. In addition, center right parties that emphasized the salience of nationalism performed electorally worse. Most substantively, center right parties in Europe that emphasized the immigration issue performed considerably well during the crisis period, increasing their vote share by over 3% points. The variable is also statistically significant at the  $p < 0.01$  level and provides strong empirical evidence for H3 and in showing how the center right outperforms the extreme right on the immigration issue in the economic crisis period. Turning to party-level variables, model 4 shows that the center right party vote share was considerably stronger in Western Europe, with the vote share for center right parties considerably stronger in plurality based electoral systems and to a lesser extent in PR based systems. Party competence however had a negative effect on the center right party vote share and shows that center right party vote share was not driven by the perceived competence amongst voters in Europe. Compared to the extreme right-wing party models, model 4 suggests that the center right vote share was stronger in the context of the 2008-2013 economic crisis, with center right parties increasing their vote share in countries where unemployment rates were higher and in countries which had higher levels of economic growth.<sup>10</sup>

Most significantly, Table 1 suggests that center right parties across Europe outperformed the extreme right on the immigration issue during the economic crisis period. Additional models were run (see Table 3 in the Appendix) and these models showed that center left and extreme left-wing parties performed considerably worse electorally in comparison to center

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<sup>10</sup> An additional model was run that examined the relationship between objective levels of migration and the center right party vote share. The model further showed the importance of emphasizing immigration, with objective levels of migration having little effect in explaining center right party performance in the economic crisis period.

right parties when emphasizing the issue of immigration. In order to further show the robustness of this empirical relationship for mainstream center right parties, margins plots with 95% confidence intervals were produced from the statistical models in Table 2. The margins plot in Figure 1.3 shows that emphasizing the immigration issue increased the % vote share for center right parties at the aggregate level. Figure 1.3 also suggests that center right parties who did not emphasize immigration lost out electorally in the crisis period and suggests that overall emphasizing the immigration issue was an ‘electoral winning formula’ for the center right in the crisis period. Figure 1.4 depicts a different story for extreme right-wing parties. This figure shows that the salience of immigration did not clearly win votes overall for the extreme right in Europe and that in comparison to center right parties, the overall % vote share is lower in national parliamentary elections. In addition, the confidence intervals are also wide, with no above zero values outside the confidence intervals and significant ‘losses’ at high levels of immigration salience for a number of extreme right-wing parties.

**Table 2: Extreme Right-Wing & Mainstream Center Right Party Model- % Change in Vote Share: 2005-2012**

	(M2) Extreme Right (2005-2012)	(M3) Extreme Right (with Change in Migration Levels) (2005-2012)	(M4) Center- Right (2005-2012)
<b>Issue Positions</b>			
Position: Pro- Welfare	1.19 (1.07)	0.53 (0.43)	-
Position: Pro-Market Economy	-	-	-0.36 (-0.32)
Position: Pro- Nationalism	-0.45 (-0.39)	-	-1.11 (-1.18)

Position: Anti-Immigration	-0.74 (-0.30)	-	-0.60 (-0.50)
<b>Issue Salience</b>			
Salience: Welfare	-4.81 (-2.78)	-4.62 (-1.87)	-
Salience: Market Economy	-	-	0.38 (0.32)
Salience: Immigration	2.86 (1.77)	<b>1.92*</b> <b>(2.02)</b>	<b>3.02**</b> <b>(2.64)</b>
Salience: Nationalism	-0.05 (-0.05)	0.44 (0.55)	-0.82 (-0.90)
<b>Party-Level</b>			
Western Europe	0.39 (0.13)	-0.65 (-0.25)	2.69 (1.21)
Party Competence	-1.54 (-0.31)	4.31 (0.87)	-3.85 (-0.95)
Plurality Electoral System	-3.98 (-1.84)	-1.57 (-0.59)	<b>4.53*</b> <b>(2.57)</b>
PR Electoral System	-4.30 (-1.16)	-2.66 (-0.87)	5.60 (1.38)
<b>Country-Level</b>			
Change in GDP (2008-2012)	0.22 (0.46)	0.19 (0.41)	0.33 (1.29)
Change in Unemployment (2008-2012)	-0.48 (-1.88)	0.11 (0.30)	0.38 (1.59)
Change in Migration (2008-2012)	-	0.008 (0.42)	-
Level 1 Constant (Party-Level)	16.10	2.62 (0.23)	35.93
Level 2 Constant	2.01	-	3.41


(Country-Level)			
Level 1 N	30	21	61
Level 2 N	23	-	24
Adjusted R2	-	0.50	-

Notes: t statistics in parentheses; statistical significance \* p < 0.05, \*\* p < 0.01, \*\*\* p < 0.001.


Dependent Variable: (% Change in Vote Share, 2005-2012, National Parliamentary Elections)

**Figure 1.3: Center Right Parties' Emphasis on Immigration & Electoral Resilience (95% Confidence Intervals) (Inclusion of Party-Level and Country-Level Controls)**





**Figure 1.4: Extreme Right-Wing Parties' Emphasis on Immigration (95% Confidence Intervals) (Inclusion of Party-Level and Country-Level Controls)**



**5.6 Emphasizing the Immigration Card: 'New Electoral Winning Formula?'**

Due to the aggregate level models, this paper is unable to directly test the valence model of immigration, in terms of whether the center right are perceived as the best party to deliver on the immigration issue amongst voters. However, the empirical findings suggest that there is a mechanism of ‘strategic emphasis’ at play. The political scientist Herbert Kitschelt (1995) coined the phrase ‘electoral winning formula’ that referred to the extreme right’s dominance in the 1990’s in adopting neo-liberal economic positions, alongside hardline positions on the authoritarian dimension towards issues such as crime, law and order alongside immigration that brought this party family electoral success in a number of countries across Western Europe. Since Kitschelt’s landmark study, a number of scholars have shown how the immigration issue has come to dominate the ideology of the extreme right and the voters that this party family attracts (see Lubbers et al, 2002; Mudde, 2007; Arzheimer, 2009; Werts et al, 2012). This study provides empirical evidence for a ‘new electoral winning formula’, whereby mainstream center right parties can profit electorally from emphasizing the immigration issue in times of economic crisis. Thus, the central theoretical argument in this paper is one of ‘strategic emphasis’, whereby the empirical evidence suggests that mainstream center right parties are able to emphasize the right issue in the 2008-2013 economic crisis period and benefit significantly from an emphasis on immigration in national parliamentary elections (see Bale, 2008; Pardos-Prado, 2015). Therefore, these findings have implications for the contemporary party competition literature in suggesting that center right parties have the potential not only to emphasize the immigration issue and benefit from this party strategy electorally, but can even ‘own’ the issue from extreme right-wing parties in certain cases. These empirical findings also point to the electoral resilience of center right parties in being able to challenge and outperform the extreme right on their core issue of immigration, inside periods of economic crisis. Future research should seek to build on these findings in understanding the resiliency of the center right across Europe through examining

the counterfactual case; in examining how center right parties and extreme right-wing parties emphasize the issue of immigration outside periods of economic crisis.

## **CONCLUSION & DISCUSSION**

This paper examined the context of the 2008-2013 economic crisis and the party competition between extreme right-wing and mainstream center right parties in Europe around the immigration issue in national parliamentary elections. This paper tested two rival models in the issue based voting literature that comprise positional (spatial) alongside salience models and drew on an original aggregate level dataset (2005-2012) in order to examine the electoral success of both party families around the issue of immigration. Traditionally, the extreme right-wing party family has been seen not only to emphasize the immigration issue, but to ‘own’ it. This paper found that the salience of immigration did benefit extreme right-wing parties electorally during the recent economic crisis. However, statistical models suggested that mainstream center right parties benefited significantly from emphasizing the immigration issue and enabled this party family to exploit the economic crisis electorally. Furthermore, center right parties that did not make the salience of immigration important lost out electorally in the economic crisis period. The central theoretical argument in this paper is one of ‘strategic emphasis’, whereby mainstream center right parties are able to emphasize the right issue in the economic crisis period and benefit significantly from the immigration issue (see Bale, 2008; Pardos-Prado, 2015). General patterns of electoral volatility were also found, with incumbent and center left parties across Europe losing out considerably from the economic crisis. Therefore, this paper showed that mainstream center right parties are electorally resilient, in having the potential to ‘own’ the immigration issue during times of economic crisis.

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## APPENDIX A: Additional Models

**Table 3: Additional OLS Regression Models (CL and EL Party Performance, 2005-2012)**

	(M5) Center Left (2005-2012)	(M6) Extreme Left (2005-2012)
<b>Issue Positions</b>		
Position: Pro-Welfare	-1.94 (-0.72)	1.01 (0.39)
Position: Pro-Distribution	-	-1.94 (-0.68)
Position: Pro-Nationalism	-0.23 (-0.58)	-1.44 (-0.76)
Position: Support	2.16	1.07

Immigration	(0.58)	(0.45)
<b>Issue Salience</b>		
Salience: Welfare	-1.78 (-0.49)	3.66 (-1.25)
Salience: Immigration	3.59 (1.19)	-2.68 (-1.09)
Salience: Nationalism	-2.43 (-0.97)	-0.38 (-0.20)
<b>Party-Level</b>		
Western Europe	6.11 (1.09)	-2.21 (-0.40)
Party Competence	-2.24 (-0.21)	-1.81 (-0.22)
Plurality Electoral System	-6.43 (-1.68)	-4.70 (-1.27)
PR Electoral System	-9.58 (-1.50)	-7.73 (-1.16)
<b>Country-Level</b>		
Change in GDP (2008-2012)	0.69 (1.42)	-0.20 (-0.33)
Change in Unemployment (2008-2012)	-0.09 (-0.14)	-0.15 (-0.38)
Level 1 Constant (Party-Level)	63.14	44.63
Level 2 Constant (Country-Level)	5.09	1.01
Level 1 N	30	30
Level 2 N	24	23

Notes: t statistics in parentheses; statistical significance \* p < 0.05, \*\* p < 0.01, \*\*\* p < 0.001. (% Change in Vote Share, 2005-2012, National Parliamentary Elections) Models run with robust standard errors Models run for Center Left and Extreme Left-Wing Party Families (Immigration variables have little effect in the electoral success of both party families in the economic crisis period)



## **Appendix B- List of Key Variables:**

### **Change in Party Performance Dataset**

#### **Dependent variables:**

**Change in the % Party Vote Share (2005-2012):** the difference in percentage of aggregate votes between the last two national parliamentary elections years (see country and parties).

**Change in the % Extreme Right-Wing Party Vote Share (2005-2012):** the difference in percentage of aggregate votes between the last two national parliamentary election years (see country and parties)

**Change in the % Center-Right Party Vote Share (2005-2012):** the difference in percentage of aggregate votes between the last two national parliamentary election years (see country and parties)

#### **Independent variables:**

### **Issue Position (Spatial/Proximity Model)**

- Anti- Immigration (1= Pro- Immigration, 7= Anti- Immigration)
- Support Nationalism (1= Internationalist, 7= Nationalist)
- Support Inequality (1= unjustified/undesirable, 7= justified/desirable)
- Pro- Welfare (1= universal, 7= means-tested)
- Pro- Market Economy: (1= Against Markets, 7= Pro Market)
- Pro- Distribution (1= Anti-Distribution, 7= Pro Distribution)

### **Issue Salience (Salience Model)**

- Immigration (1= Not Important, 7= Very Important)
- Nationalism (1= Not Important, 7 = Very Important)

- Inequality (1= Not Important, 7= Very Important)
- Welfare (1= Not Important, 7= Very Important)
- Market Economy: (1= Not Important, 7= Very Important)
- Democracy (1= Not Important, 7= 7 Very Important)
- Taxation (1= Not Important, 7= Very Important)
- Distribution (1= Not Important, 7= Very Important)

### **Party-Level Variables**

#### **Western Europe**

- 1= Western Europe
- 0= Central-Eastern Europe

#### **Plurality Electoral System**

- 1= Plurality Electoral System
- 0= Other Electoral System

#### **Proportional Representation Electoral System**

- 1= Proportional Representation Electoral System
- 0= Other Electoral System

#### **Bicameral Parliament**

- 1= Bicameral Parliament
- 0= Other

#### **Incumbent**

- 1= Incumbent Party
- 0= Non-Incumbent

#### **Party Competence**

Competence: from the European Values Survey 2008 (V221): “How much confidence in: political parties?” response categories: a great deal, quite a lot, not very much, and none at all. Reverse coded to make aggregate intuitive.

**Party Family:** Extreme Left, Center Left, Conservative/Center Right and Extreme Right

### **Country-Level Variables**

**Change in Unemployment (2008-2012):** World Bank data, *Source:*  
[www.worldbank.org/data.html](http://www.worldbank.org/data.html)

**Change in GDP annual growth (2008-2012):** World Bank data, *Source:*  
[www.worldbank.org/data.html](http://www.worldbank.org/data.html)

**Change in Migration: Dataset (2008-2012):** International Migration Database; OECD. StatExtracts <http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?datasetcode=MIG> “Inflows of foreign population by nationality”

## **Classification of Parties and Countries I: Country/Electoral Years/Party**

### **Austria: 2006-2008**

Alliance for the Future of Austria  
Freedom Party of Austria  
The Greens  
Austrian People's Party  
Social Democratic Party of Austria

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### **Belgium: 2007-2010**

Christian-Democratic & Flemish  
New Flemish Alliance  
Humanist Democratic Centre  
Ecologists  
National Front  
The Flemish Greens  
List Dedecker  
Reform Movement  
Socialist Party  
Socialist Party. Different  
Flemish Interest  
Flemish Liberals and Democrats

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### **Bulgaria: 2005-2009**

Bulgarian Socialist Party  
Bulgarian People's Union  
Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria  
Democrats for a Strong Bulgaria  
Movement for Rights and Freedoms  
National Movement for Stability and Progress  
National Union Attack  
Union of Democratic Forces

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**Czech Republic: 2006-2010**

Christian and Democratic Union  
Czech Social Democratic Party  
Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia  
Civic Democratic Party  
Green Party

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**Denmark: 2007-2011**

Danish People's Party  
Unity List - The Red-Greens  
Conservative People's Party  
New/Liberal Alliance  
Radical Liberals  
Social Democracy  
Socialist People's Party  
Denmark's Liberal Party

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**Estonia: 2007-2011**

Estonian Centre Party  
Estonian Greens  
Pro Patria and Res Publica Union  
Estonian Reform Party  
Estonian People's Union  
Social Democratic Party

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**Finland: 2007-2011**

Finnish Christian Democrats  
Finnish Centre  
National Coalition Party  
True Finns  
Finnish Social Democratic Party  
Swedish People's Party in Finland  
Left Alliance  
Green Alliance

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**France: 2007-2012**

Democratic Movement  
National Front  
Movement for France  
New Center  
French Communist Party  
Left Radical Party  
Socialist Party  
Union for a Popular Movement  
The Greens

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**Germany: 2005-2009**

The Left (Party of Democratic Socialism, PDS)  
Christian Democracy Union

Christian Social Union  
Free Democratic Party  
Alliance 90/The Greens  
Social Democratic Party of Germany  
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**Greece: 2007-2009**

Communist Party of Greece  
Popular Orthodox Rally  
New Democracy  
Panhellenic Socialist Movement  
Coalition of the Left, the Movements and the Ecology  
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**Hungary: 2006-2010**

Fidesz - Hungarian Civic Union  
Christian Democratic People's Party  
Hungarian Democratic Forum  
Hungarian Justice and Life Party  
Hungarian Socialist Party  
Union of Free Democrats  
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**Ireland: 2007-2011**

Soldiers of Destiny  
Family of the Irish  
Green Party  
Labour Party  
Progressive Democrats  
We Ourselves  
Communist  
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**Italy: 2006-2008**

Italy of Values  
Left Democrats  
Party of Italian Communists  
National Alliance/PdL  
Forza Italia/PdL  
Leaga Nord  
Italian Democratic Socialists  
Union of Christian and Centre Democrats  
Communist Refoundation Party  
Green Federation  
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**Latvia: 2006-2010**

Latvian Social Democratic Workers' Party  
Fatherland and Freedom  
New Era  
Latvia's First Party / Latvia's Way  
Union of Greens and Peasants  
For Human Rights in United Latvia  
Harmony Centre  
People's Party

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**Lithuania: 2004-2008**

Fatherland Union  
Order and Justice - Liberal Democrats  
Lithuanian Poles' Electoral Alliance  
Labour Party  
Liberal and Centre Union  
Liberals' Movement of the Republic of Lithuania  
Lithuanian Social Democratic Party/New Union - Social Liberals  
Lithuanian Peasant Popular Union  
Civic Democratic Party

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**Moldova: 2005-2009**

Party Alliance Our Moldova  
Communist Party of the Republic of Moldova  
Democratic Party of Moldova  
Christian Democratic People's Party  
Soc-Lib/Dem Party

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**Netherlands: 2006-2010**

Democrats 66  
Labour Party  
Party for the Animals  
Christian Democratic Appeal  
Christian Union  
Green Left  
Freedom Party  
Reformed Political Party  
Socialist Party  
People's Party for Freedom and Democracy

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**Poland: 2007-2011**

Left and Democrats  
League of Polish Families  
Law and Justice  
Civic Platform  
Polish People's Party  
Self-Defense of the Republic of Poland

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**Portugal: 2005-2009**

Democratic Social Centre  
Left Bloc  
Portuguese Communist Party  
Ecological Party The Greens  
Socialist Party  
Social Democratic Party

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**Romania: 2004-2008**

Democratic Party  
Liberal Democratic Party

New Generation Party  
National Liberal Party  
Christian Democratic National Peasant's Party  
Great Romania Party  
Social Democratic Party  
Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania

**Slovakia: 2006-2010**

Direction - Social Democracy  
People's Party - Movement for a Democratic Slovakia  
Christian Democratic Movement  
Party of the Hungarian Coalition  
Slovak Democratic and Christian Union  
Slovak National Party

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**Slovenia: 2004-2008**

Democratic Pensioners' Party of Slovenia  
Liberal Democracy of Slovenia  
New Slovenia - Christian People's Party  
Social Democrats  
Slovenian Democratic Party  
Slovenian People's Party  
Slovenian National Party

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**Spain: 2004-2008**

Convergence and Union of Catalonia  
Basque National Party  
Navarre Yes  
Galician Nationalist Bloc  
Canarian Coalition  
Aragonese Union  
Basque Solidarity  
Republican Left of Catalonia  
United Left  
People's Party  
Spanish Socialist Workers' Party

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**Sweden: 2006-2010**

Sweden Democrats  
Centre Party  
Liberal People's Party  
Christian Democrats  
Moderate Rally Party  
Environment Party The Greens  
Social Democratic Workers' Party  
Left Party

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**UK: 2005-2010**

Conservative Party  
Labour Party



Liberal Democrats  
Party of Wales  
Scottish National Party  
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**Ukraine: 2007-2012**

Bloc Yulia Tymoshenko  
Communist Party of Ukraine  
People's Bloc Lytvyn  
People's Self-Defense/People's Union Our Ukraine  
Party of Regions  
Progressive Socialist Party of Ukraine  
Green Party  
Socialist Party of Ukraine

## Classification of Parties and Countries II

Country	Center Right	Extreme Right
Austria	BZÖ OVP	FPÖ
Belgium	CD&V N-VA LDD MR VLD	FN VB
Bulgaria	BPU NMSS NUA	DSB UDF
Czech Republic	KDU-CSL SZ	ODS
Denmark	KF NA VENSTRE	DF
Estonia		IRL RE
Finland	KD KESK PS SFP	KOK
France	NC UMP	FN MPF
Germany	CDU FDP	CSU
Greece	ND	LAOS
Hungary	FIDESZ KDNP	MIEP
Ireland	FF FG	PD
Italy	IdV UDC	AN FI LN
Latvia	TB/LNNK JL LPP LZS	TP
Lithuania	TiT	TS-LK LCS LRLS
Moldova	PAMN	PPCD PSL
Poland	PIS PO	LPR
Portugal	PS PSD	CDS-PP
Romania	PD PLD PNL PNTCD UDMR	PNG

Slovakia	SDKU SNS	KDH
Slovenia	SDS SLS SNS	NS
Spain	EAJ-PNV	CiU CC PP
Sweden	C FP KD M	Swedish Democrats
	NBL NSNU PRU	
Ukraine	PV	BBT-UP PZU
The Netherlands	CDA CU SGP VVD	VERDONK PVV

**NOTES:**

- Because the People's Party (TP) in Latvia joined with First Party / Latvia's Way (LPP) in 2010 but have different places in some dimensions, we divided the 2010 total of votes for the three parties by thirds, giving TP 1/3 (or 2.61) and LPP 2/3 (or 5.21).
- Because the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP) and the Ecological Party - The Greens (PEV) joined in the 2009 election but were separate before, we give ½ of the 2009 combined votes to each of them.
- In Italy, Forza Italia (2006) renamed itself The People of Freedom (PdL) and was joined by the National Alliance (NA). The totals for the PdL were divided by thirds with two thirds going to Forza and one third going to NA (based on their relative 2006 performance). In addition, a coalition of the left, The Left – The Rainbow, was a reconfiguration including the Communist Refoundation Party, Party of Italian Communists, Federation of the Greens, and The Democratic Socialists. The total for The Rainbow is divided in quarters among these parties.
- In Lithuania, the Lithuanian Social Democratic Party (LSDP) formed a union with the New Union - Social Liberals (NS). We take the mean of their scores for both time periods.
- In Romania in 2004, the National Liberal Party and the Democratic Party were together in the “Justice and Truth Alliance”. They ran separately in 2008. Their percentage for 2004 is according to the distribution of seats (112 total (31.5% of total): 64 to NLP (57% of 122), 48 to DP (43% of 122)). For 2008, the Democratic Liberal Party (PDL) was formed by the Democratic Party and the Liberal Democratic Party (PLD) in 2007. We assigned 50% of the 32.4 total percentage to each.

- In Ukraine, “Bloc of Yuri Lutsenko “People’s Self-Defense” (NS) merged with “People’s Union Our Ukraine” (NSNU) for the 2012 Parliamentary elections. They are merged here.
- For the second stage of the analysis in CEE, the Liberal Democratic Party (PLD) and Christian Democratic National Peasant’s Party (PNTCD) in Romania and the Green Party (PZU) in Ukraine were dropped as there were no observations for them in the EUREQUAL dataset.

**APPENDIX C- Measurement of Variables:**

<b>Variable Name</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>Standard Deviation</b>	<b>N</b>	<b>Minimum</b>	<b>Maximum</b>
% Change in Party Vote (National Parliamentary Elections, 2005-2012)	-7.45	7.04	190	-24.11	39.72
% Change in Extreme Right-Wing Vote Share, 2005-2012	0.40	6.05	34	-17.09	14.47
% Change in Center- Right Vote Share, 2005-2012	-1.19	6.90	64	-24.11	16.2
% Change in Center- Left Vote Share, 2005-2012	-3.60	9.30	32	-24.1	20.3
% Change in Extreme Left-Wing Vote Share, 2005-2012	-1.59	7.38	34	-23.91	20.28
Anti-Immigration	3.74	1.30	192	1	6.7
Support Nationalism	4.04	1.60	179	1	7
Support Inequality	3.36	1.39	192	1	6.3
Pro-Welfare	3.59	1.18	192	1	6.4
Pro-Market Economy	4.08	1.41	191	1	7
Pro-Distribution	3.90	1.15	192	1.1	6.5
Incumbents	0.30	0.46	192	0	1
Saliency: Immigration	4.47	1.02	192	2	7
Saliency: Nationalism	5.11	1.13	179	2	7
Saliency: Welfare	4.47	0.93	192	1	6.75

Saliience: Market Economy	5.02	1.06	191	1	7
Western Europe	0.43	0.50	192	0	1
Party Competence	1.95	0.25	181	1.2	2.58
Plurality Electoral System	0.46	0.50	192	0	1
PR Electoral System	0.93	0.26	192	0	1
Bicameral Parliament	0.53	0.50	192	0	1
Change in Unemployment, 2008-2012	0.68	3.7	192	-8.1	10.3
Change in GDP Growth, 2008-2012	-3.26	3.5	192	-13.5	2.3
Change in Migration Levels (OECD) (2008-2012)	-5.2	64.7	139	-257.3	47.6