

‘A New Form of Politics’: Brexit, Immigration and the rise of Populism in Europe

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I - Introduction

Despite the efforts of a large part of the government and the Remain camp through their strategy of drawing on objective arguments which outlined the economic risks associated with Brexit, on the 23rd June 2016 Britain voted to leave the European Union (EU) by a margin of 52-48%. In order to achieve a better understanding of why the majority of British voters decided to leave the EU we need to first trace the historical processes of what we call in this chapter, 'British Exceptionalism'. Drawing on original polling data from Eurobarometer surveys, this chapter examines the attitudes of the British public towards membership of the EU compared to European citizens taken as a whole from 1973-2016. The data is then broken down across decades in order to examine variations in support for the EU amongst the British public. The central argument of this article is that Britain has always been a 'reluctant' member of the EU.

Against this backdrop, the chapter then turns to investigate the increasing politicization and salience of the immigration issue in British politics since 2005 and how immigration became the central issue that dominated the EU Referendum outcome in 2016. The third and final section then outlines how the salience of immigration has also driven support for populist radical right parties in both France (Front National) and Germany (Alternative for Germany). With Brexit proving to be a reality, the chapter will outline how this anti-establishment insurgency has direct implications for the upcoming French, German and Dutch Elections in 2017.

II - ‘The Reluctant Europeans’: British Exceptionalism from 1973-2016


From the start, Britain's membership of the European Union was controversial, both domestically and internationally amongst fellow European neighbours.¹ The French President Charles de Gaulle frequently vetoed British membership throughout the 1960's. Yet, despite the challenges, the United Kingdom finally became a member of the EU in 1973 under Ted Heath's Conservative Government with the Labour Party split on the issue.

Taking 1973 as our benchmark, this section provides an overview of public perceptions amongst the British public towards the EU and draws on trend data from the Eurobarometer (conducted by Kantar Public) from 1973-2016 that allows us to track changes in public opinion across roughly each decade of membership (1973-1980, 1981-1990, post-1990, 2000 onwards). The question that we examine asks survey respondents the following: "Generally speaking, do you think the United Kingdom's membership of the EU is a good or bad thing?" A random sample of survey respondents across the country were asked this question roughly twice a year from 1973-2011, providing us with an uninterrupted trend series across time. The time series trend starts in September 1973 and is represented in Figure 1.1 below.

¹ The European Union in its earliest form was known as the European Economic Community (EEC) and can be seen as a precursor to the European Union which incorporated the European Communities in 1993.


Legend

Each of the following trendlines within this chapter display the data in the same way. The **dark blue** and **dark red** lines represent the UK results for this question. The **light blue** and **light red** lines represent the average of all EU Member States. Other EU Member States were of course asked about their own country's membership of the EU.



The fact that the dark blue line, which represents the proportion of British respondents who think that membership is a good thing, is consistently lower than the lighter blue line, representing attitudes in the rest of the EU, goes to show that Brexit shouldn't have come as a surprise: Britain has always been a reluctant member, sporting an approval rating of 20 percentage points lower than the European average.

Figure 1.1: Attitudes towards Britain's Membership of the EU (1973-2011)




The early years (1973 – 1980)

The first period (1973-1980) shows the UK reaching its lowest result on record, with the proportion of people who think membership is a good thing hovering just above the 20% mark at the end of the decade. This suggests from the very start that the UK was a reluctant member of the EU and was largely a government-led venture with very little public support. These low results likely reflected early forms of Euroscepticism that formed as a consequence of years of being rejected membership by other EU Member States, and the negative press that covered it. The 20% approval and 50% disapproval provides a stark contrast to the EU average result (with the lighter colours) which is much more positive and shows general support for the European project.

In 1974, shortly after coming to office, Labour Prime Minister Harold Wilson promised to put the issue of EU membership to the British people in a Referendum.² The final result was unanimously in favour of staying in, with 67% voting to continue their membership in June 1975. Interestingly, the period surrounding the referendum also saw a large bounce in the polls with regard to the UK's European membership, likely as a result of the Government's campaign to remain. However, shortly after the referendum, the positive result, which came as a surprise to the European project proved to be no more than a poll bounce or a blip, with the years of 1975-1980 seeing results return to their normal levels of overwhelming Euroscepticism.

Figure 1.2: Attitudes towards Britain's Membership of the EU (Period 1: 1973-1980)



New hopes for the European project (1981 – 1990)

This decade was arguably one of the most important in forming what the British public have now come to associate with the EU. The early years first witnessed the enlargement to some of the Mediterranean countries, such as Spain, Portugal and Greece – which have all since had numerous economic issues with handling their national debt amidst the recent Eurozone crisis. Shortly after Thatcher negotiated a rebate on the UK's contribution to the EU budget, which continued to feed into the negative rhetoric surrounding the EU's mismanagement.

Perhaps most importantly, the Schengen Treaty was signed in 1985, which created the borderless zone across the continent. The UK managed to negotiate opting out of the treaty, and yet despite this, the concept of free movement and uncontrolled immigration continued to fuel the anti-EU debate. The Single European Act was signed in 1986, which sought to create a single market by 1992.


² Helm, Toby. "British Euroscepticism: A Brief History." The Guardian. 7th February 2016. Date Accessed: 1st September 2016. <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/feb/07/british-euroscepticism-a-brief-history>

Against the backdrop of a rapidly developing EU, the 1980's also coincided with a dramatic shift in Conservative and Labour Party attitudes towards Europe. Figure 1.3 breaks down perceptions amongst the British public from 1981-1990. During this period, the time trend in Figure 1.3 highlights two key points in history. Firstly, the European outlook steadily improved, achieving higher levels of support for the European project than ever seen before.

Secondly, the EU and the UK both witnessed a similar trend and shows support coalescing in public opinion. A key event during this period was Thatcher's Bruges speech³ in 1988 which outlined a Eurosceptic vision of Europe, and her worry that the original vision of Europe as a trading area would be extended to an ever greater political and economic union. During the same period, Neil Kinnock's Labour Party shifted from its Eurosceptic stance in the 1970's towards supporting the European project. However, this period also saw Kinnock face increasing pressure from the left-wing section of his party.

Despite Thatcher's efforts to put on the breaks and voice her Eurosceptic concerns, for the first time the prospects of a happy relationship with the EU started to look good. The UK managed to opt out of signing the Schengen Treaty, safeguarding security concerns of the Government and the public, and Thatcher also negotiated a significant rebate on the UK's contribution. The positive developments of the EU and the achievements of the British government to safeguard British interests are reflected in a steady improvement of British opinion. Overall, it demonstrated that the EU was prepared to listen to the UK and make compromises in order to keep it as a member.

Figure 1.3: Attitudes towards Britain's Membership of the EU (Period 2: 1981-1990)



Post-1990's slump

The growing optimism among the British public was unfortunately short lived and was met with an equally steady decline in perceptions, sinking once again to the low levels witnessed in the 70's. Positive perceptions of the EU reached its 40 year peak in the UK in 1990. Figure 1.4 shows a steady decline in public opinion, both across the EU but is particularly pronounced in the UK.


³ Helm, Toby. "British Euroscepticism: A Brief History." The Guardian. 7th February 2016. Date Accessed: 1st September 2016. <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/feb/07/british-euroscepticism-a-brief-history>

Events in this period proved to be tumultuous with Thatcher's downfall and the European Exchange Rate mechanism collapse in 1992, alongside the creation of the modern day EU from the Maastricht Treaty. During this period John Major's Government faced frequent division over Europe with a number of Eurosceptic cabinet members, with notable figures such as Michael Portillo and John Redwood voicing their dissent. At the same time, Tony Blair's rebranding of New Labour coincided with the party committing itself to the EU and the prospect of greater integration and enlargement in the future.⁴

New Labour's shift to the centre ground and new found dedication to integration capitalised on the warming of British citizens towards the European project but at the same time stood in stark contrast to the Government's position over the preceding decade. By the end of Thatcher's tenure, the Tories had replaced Labour as the party of Euroscepticism, as her downfall within her own party was most likely triggered by her opposition to Mr Delors' social EU plans in her speech in Bruges.

The ejection from the European exchange rate mechanism and the signing of the Maastricht treaty provided the British tabloids with fresh anti-EU ammunition, which in turn contributed to the weakening of EU trust and opinion among the general public. Thatcher's resignation in 1990 also arguably marked the end of strong resistance towards the encroaching EU, giving way to a much weaker John Major who was relieved of his power shortly after.

Figure 1.4: Attitudes towards Britain's Membership of the EU (Period 3: 1991-2000)



Brexit beats recovery (2000-2016)

The millennial period saw a slight recovery in public perceptions surrounding the UK's place in the EU and Figure 1.5 depicts this relationship. The '90's witnessed the public's positive perception of EU membership spiral downwards from around the 60% mark to 30%. This began to level off around the same time that Blair took office in 1997. However it is worth highlighting that Two years after his re-election to office in 2003, negative perceptions overtook positive perceptions.


⁴ Helm, Toby. "British Euroscepticism: A Brief History." The Guardian. 7th February 2016. Date Accessed: 1st September 2016. <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/feb/07/british-euroscepticism-a-brief-history>

To provide some perspective, the general view of EU membership amongst the public had been more positive than negative for the previous 20 years (since 1983).⁵ From an EU wide perspective, the UK was the only country to witness levels as low as this – in all other Member States, positive perceptions of the general public always historically outweighed those with negative views.

When Gordon Brown took office in 2007, he was met with one of the largest financial crises Europe had seen – this unsurprisingly was a big blow for the European project. The end of the decade saw Euroscepticism on top, reigniting the Eurosceptic wing within the Conservative party as well as giving momentum and much needed credibility to the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), which gained significant traction in national and European Parliament elections in 2009.⁶

Movements in British public opinion virtually mirrored those observed on the continent but despite this, views on both sides of the channel never converged. Positive opinion of the EU in the UK consistently trailed by 20 percentage points since the UK joined the community in 1973. The European average on the other hand very rarely saw opinion levels sink past the 50% mark. This reflects the general attitude the UK has had since it joined. The relationship was always assessed on the basis of checks, balances, benefits and costs, whereas Britain's European counterparts had invested on a more emotional level.

Figure 1.5: Attitudes towards Britain’s Membership of the EU (Period 4: 2001-2011)



The European Commission decided to stop asking the question about EU membership after 2011 so we turn to a new question which similarly gauges public opinion. This question asked whether the EU conjured up a positive or a negative opinion for respondents. There was also a ‘neutral’ option but for the sake of clarity, this is not presented in the trendline below.

⁵ Helm, Toby. “British Euroscepticism: A Brief History.” The Guardian. 7th February 2016. Date Accessed: 1st September 2016. <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/feb/07/british-euroscepticism-a-brief-history>

⁶ Ford, Robert. & Goodwin, Matthew (2014). *Revolt on the right: Explaining support for the radical right in Britain*. Routledge.


Figure 1.6 shows that the UK did not only trail behind the overall EU trend in terms of sentiment but the British public also reacted in a much more negative way in 2011. This year saw many countries re-enter recession, as well as disputes around various bailout packages. David Cameron assumed office in 2010 and arguably used the gradual recovery of the British economy against the backdrop of the failing European economy as a reason for offering the British public a referendum on membership of the EU. This eventually became part of his platform in 2015 to appease the Eurosceptics inside his own party and seek to ameliorate the threat of UKIP's electoral advance on the EU issue.

The 2015 general election also provided the Conservatives with a landslide victory over the Labour party and as part of Cameron's pledge, a referendum on the EU was put to the British public. Interestingly, during the same period and for the first time in history, British and European public opinion alike effectively converged in their view towards the EU (if we observe the proportion who have a positive opinion in Figure 1.6).

However, it should be highlighted that a rise was also witnessed in the negative perceptions of the EU in the run up to the referendum amongst the British public. As mentioned, respondents on this question could also answer that they had a neutral opinion. In the final months, the number of those who said that they were neutral rapidly decreased as the general public were effectively forced to form their own opinion on the issue. From the figure below, it is clear that those sitting on the fence were better mobilized by the Brexit campaign, since the 'negative opinion' grew at a much faster rate from 2015.

Although Figure 1.6 seems to suggest that British public opinion appeared to improve in the final months, years and years of ingrained British Euroscepticism eventually prevailed on 23rd June. Evidently, Britain has always been a 'reluctant' member of the EU and this phenomenon can be viewed as 'British Exceptionalism'.

Figure 1.6: Attitudes towards the EU in general (2002-2016)



III - Salience of the Immigration issue across the continent


One key issue that has gained significant traction in both the UK and countries across the EU is the topic of immigration. Recent years have seen a number of hard-hitting terrorist attacks and perhaps most significantly, the EU as an institution has failed in its handling of the refugee crisis. With no common foreign and security policy, the EU was unable to react effectively to the crisis in the Mediterranean and was consequently scolded by national press.

The Eurobarometer asks respondents across the EU several questions that are relevant to this topic. One question that is particularly pertinent to the discussion is a question that asks respondents what they think are the two most important issues facing the country. Europeans were provided with around 15 answer options to choose from, ranging from taxation to pensions, and immigration to terrorism. Focussing only on the proportion of people who selected immigration, it is clear from the figure below that the UK has always stood apart from its European counterparts.

Of the 15 or so answer options, immigration has always been chosen by around 30% of people in the UK, rising to 44% in November 2015. At the same time, an additional quarter of respondents selected terrorism as one of the leading concerns for the country. Overall, it seems that more than half of British people are concerned about either of the two issues and this has been a consistent trend since the question was first put to the general public in 2005 when the Conservatives came to power.


By contrast, the issue of immigration has been much less of an issue for two other leading powers in the EU: France and Germany. Despite being proponents of the Schengen area which allows for the free movement of EU citizens, the proportion of people in each of the countries that consider immigration as one of the main problems has historically been considerably lower than in the UK. However, it is worth noting that in recent years, and likely as a result of Merkel's open-door policy in response to the refugee crisis, Germans have increasingly considered immigration as the main issue facing the country.

Figure 2.1: Most important issue facing country: immigration (2005-2016)



For Germany, the free movement of people across the continent is no longer restricted to EU citizens but now refugees and migrants escaping wars in the Middle-East. Traditionally, Germany was always a safe haven but recent terrorist attacks in the country are slowly eroding the welcoming attitudes. To a lesser extent, the same trend is also taking place in France. Although France did not subscribe to the open-door policy, terrorist attacks – which are implicitly associated with immigration in public discourse – are becoming an increasing concern. In May 2016, around 30% of people in France and Germany considered terrorism as one of the main problems facing their country.

Figure 2.2: Most important issue facing country: terrorism (2005-2016)



In the UK, UKIP has arguably managed to capitalise on these rising concerns and at the same time has taken ownership of the anti-establishment movement. MPs in both the Labour and Conservative party are divided on where they stand on the EU. The divisions run deep through their history. Up until 1990, the Labour party had traditionally been the party that opposed EU integration, but the Tories took their place as New Labour came to the fore. Thatcher, who valued traditional conservative ideals above a closer European economic union, dragged the Conservative party to the ‘soft’ Eurosceptic platform they are known for today. UKIP on the other hand are clear in their objectives and have used their success in European elections to further their ‘hard’ Euroscepticism and cause for leaving the EU. Immigration, as shown in Figure 2.2, is clearly a big topic in today's political discourse and will only continue to pose an issue for national governments in the EU. On top of that, trust in political institutions at both the national and EU level is generally low and has weakened over the past 15 years, likely as a result of the lingering economic crises and involvement in foreign wars.

Responsibility for immigration: EU vs. National Government


Not only are immigration and terrorism contentious issues in modern day politics, but there is much disagreement in the EU about where responsibility should lie. Data from the Eurobarometer shows that the UK also stands out in this regard (Figure 2.3).

The Eurobarometer provides EU respondents with a number of policy areas and asks them whether decisions related to it should be made by the national government or the EU. Here, we will focus on the results for immigration policy and although the question was last asked in 2011, the results are still interesting to discuss. Taking the EU as a whole, almost two thirds (60%) think that decisions regarding immigration policy should be made jointly with the EU. In France, this figure stands at 70% and in Germany, 64%. It's clear that on the continent, European citizens want the EU to legislate and be involved in immigration matters; only a minority think that decisions regarding immigration policy should be dealt with solely at the national government level.

Bucking the trend, the UK holds the opposite view. In contrast, two thirds of British citizens think that decisions to do with immigration policy should be made by the national government only. Figure 2.3 shows that only 32% of respondents thought that immigration should be coordinated with the EU. This is perhaps unsurprising given the UK's unique position outside of the Schengen area but since immigration played such a large role in mobilising Brexit support, this view proved to play an influential role on the 23rd June.

Figure 2.3: Responsibility for immigration (2011)

For each of the following areas, do you think that decisions should be made by the (NATIONALITY) government, or made jointly within the European Union?
Answer: 'Immigration policy'



How EU immigrants are viewed


As part of their bi-yearly Standard Eurobarometer survey, the European Commission asks the general public what their opinion is of immigrants who come from other EU countries, with an answer scale ranging from very positive to very negative (Figure 2.4). Turning first to the results of Germany and France, we can find that a majority of people have an overall positive opinion of EU immigrants coming to their country. Figure 2.4 shows that in Germany, the proportion who are in total positive is at 62% while in France it is 56%. Taking the EU as a whole, around 57% of people share this opinion.

In the UK however, a minority of people have a positive view of EU immigrants, with a share of 48% in May 2016 and in November 2014, this proportion was as low as 42%. This shows once again that the British outlook differs from majority opinion on the continent. And while, the difference between the UK and France is not huge on this matter – just 8 percentage points – it has proved to be significant when decisions like Brexit are made with just a 4 point percentage point margin (52% Leave vs. 48% Remain).

Figure 2.4: Attitudes towards EU immigrants (2016)

Please tell me whether each of the following statements evokes a positive or negative feeling for you.
Answer: 'Immigration of people from other EU Member States'

■ Very positive ■ Fairly positive ■ Fairly negative ■ Very negative ■ Don't know




Rise in populism and declining levels of trust in institutions

The results and analysis thus far have shown how attitudes in the UK differ from the attitudes of people across the rest of the EU. The UK has always been a reluctant member of the EU and immigration in particular was an issue that was able to effectively mobilize support for Brexit. UKIP is well known for its hard stance in this regard but it is also often labelled as a populist radical right party – one that is able to mobilize the public against the government and the establishment. Similar movements are also gaining traction in other EU countries, such as France with the Front National. There are two indicators in the Eurobarometer that help us understand the anti-establishment sentiment in the EU: people's trust in the national government and their trust in the EU (Figure 2.5).

Looking firstly at trust in the national government, Figure 2.5 shows that the results are fairly low for the UK, France and Germany, as well across the EU in general. In all three countries, the share of people that 'tend to trust' their national government does not exceed 50%, and often hovers between the 20-40% mark. In France, and across the EU more generally, trust in the national government has seen a general decline over the past 15 years. In 2001, the share of people in the EU that trusted their government was around the 50% mark (48%) but this has steadily fallen over the years to just above a quarter presently (27%). In France, the deterioration is much more pronounced, in part due to the extremely low satisfaction levels for President François Hollande. The UK has witnessed a similar trend but since 2012, trust has significantly improved, now at 34% which is significantly higher than the EU average and France.

Figure 2.5: Trust in the national government (2001 – 2016)




Trust in the national government has been shown to be fairly unremarkable across the EU and moreover, it seems to be in decline. And while people in the UK now seem to trust the current government more than their EU counterparts, it was often not that way. Overall, British trust in their government is not much different to the sentiment experienced on the continent. However, when one looks at the trust in the EU, a larger separation becomes apparent (Figure 2.6).

Across the EU, it seems that citizens are generally more trustful of the EU than they are of their government. In April 2007, the level of trust almost reached the 60% mark, following the enlargement of the Schengen area to include several Central and Eastern European states. Germany, France and the EU overall have been historically aligned in their opinion of the EU. The UK on the other hand has been consistently more pessimistic towards the EU with trust ratings no less than 20 percentage points lower than elsewhere.

Figure 2.6 shows that over the past two years public opinion in the UK has converged with that on the continent. Between May 2014 and May 2016, trust almost doubled (from 16% to 30%), likely due to the increasing prospects of a referendum on the EU and the campaigning from the Remain camp. Nonetheless it is worth highlighting that the Leave camp won the referendum in a country where the level of trust in the EU is not currently far from the levels held elsewhere in the EU. Opinion levels do not seem to be improving either where there has been a steady downward trend since 2007 across the whole EU.

Figure 2.6: Trust in the EU (2003 – 2016)



With the French and German elections around the corner in 2017, the dwindling trust in national governments and the EU will be of particular significance. Both Germany and France have been hit hard by terrorist attacks over the past few years. In France, the Front National led by Marine Le Pen is becoming more and more prominent as attitudes towards immigrants has been harmed by the lingering refugee crisis and ongoing attacks. In Germany, Angela Merkel will be running for a fourth term and while her approval ratings are still fairly high, they have arguably been damaged by the terrorist attacks, which have become more being associated with her open-doors policy.

IV- Conclusion

This chapter showed that one of the main drivers of Britain leaving the European Union was arguably immigration, with the chapter showing the increased politicization in British politics. It is fundamentally clear that politicians on both the left and right of British politics have failed to recognize the long-term impact of British Euroscepticism amongst the British public. To borrow a theory from the political scientists Matthew Goodwin and Robert Ford, a large segment of people who voted for Brexit constituted the ‘left behind’ in society that comprises the traditional working class section of society. However, a large proportion of people that voted for Brexit were also committed Eurosceptics and sought to take back control. We argue that politicians are in denial if they think that Brexit was a flash in the pan event. We are living in a ‘new form of politics’, not just in Britain, but in Europe more broadly. The relationship between elected representatives and voters has evolved and politicians are now under increasing scrutiny to stand up and deliver on their election promises.

In the run up to the EU Referendum on the 23rd June, political commentators outlined the potential political and economic uncertainties that may arise as a consequence of leaving the EU. Global economic volatility is likely with the decline in value of the British pound and further economic uncertainties.⁷ Whilst debates over what Brexit will look like and when Article 50 will be

⁷ Downes, James. “To Brexit or not to Brexit.” 英國“脫歐” 何去何從. The Chinese General Chamber of Commerce,

triggered are likely to dominate the next two years of British politics, the EU is currently facing a triple 'existential' crisis.⁸ Brexit constitutes the first 'existential' crisis, with the ongoing migration crisis and disputes amongst EU member states in resolving the situation. Thirdly and most significantly, the third crisis is political and constitutes a sharp decline in trust across European democracies towards the EU.⁹ The chapter also drew on the latest Eurobarometer data to show how the salience of immigration has increased across time amongst voters in Germany and France.

Most significantly, the series of Eurobarometer data shows the increased importance of the immigration issue amongst French citizens, declining levels of support for the EU project in France. The data also demonstrates that in comparison to the UK, Germany, and the Euro area average, French citizens' satisfaction with the EU was at its lowest and most importantly these findings pointed to a distinct lack of trust in the French government led by President François Hollande. These results are generalizable and have direct implications for the upcoming French Presidential and Legislative Elections in 2017. Populist radical right parties such as Alternative for Germany (AfD), the Front National in France and Geert Wilders' Party for Freedom (PVV) have weaved a narrative of political discontent and 'hard' Euroscepticism, achieving increased prominence of late.¹⁰ With next year's French, German and Dutch parliamentary elections on the horizon and the resurgence of far right populism, we are currently living in a 'new form of politics.' Most significantly, how the EU manages and responds to these events is likely to determine its future.

Vision. http://www.cgcc.org.hk/en/chamber/bulletin/files/Bulletin_1465548781.92453_P.19-26.pdf Interview conducted in June 2016.

⁸ Rankin, Jennifer. "EU is facing existential crisis, says Jean-Claude Juncker." *The Guardian*. 14th September 2016. Date Accessed: 1st September 2016. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/sep/13/jean-claude-juncker-eu-is-facing-existential-crisis>

⁹ Schmidt, V. A. (2015). *The Eurozone's Crisis of Democratic Legitimacy. Can the EU Rebuild Public Trust and Support for European Economic Integration?* (No. 015). Directorate General Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN), European Commission.

¹⁰ Kriesi, H., & Pappas, T. S. (Eds.). (2015). *European populism in the shadow of the great recession*. ECPR Press.

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